In this paper, we study timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. As fundamental cryptographic primitives with information-theoretic security, we can consider keyagreement, encryption, and authentication codes. Therefore, in this paper we deal with informationtheoretic timed-release security for all those primitives. Specifically, we propose models and formalizations of security for information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes; we also derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for all those ones; and we show optimal constructions of all those ones. Furthermore, we investigate a relationship of mechanisms between information-theoretic timed-release key-agreement and information-theoretic key-insulated key-agreement. It turns out that there exists a simple algorithm which converts the former into the latter, and vice versa. In the sense, we conclude that these two mechanisms are essentially close.
Introduction
The security of most of present cryptographic systems is based on the assumption of difficulty of computationally hard problems such as the integer factoring problem or the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields or elliptic curves. However, taking into account recent rapid development of algorithms and computer technologies, such a system based on the assumption of difficulty of computationally hard problems might not maintain sufficient long-term security. In fact, it is known that quantum computers can easily solve the factoring and discrete logarithm problems. From these aspects, it is necessary and interesting to consider cryptographic techniques whose security does not depend on any computationally hard problems, especially for the long-term security.
Informally, the goal of timed-release cryptography is to securely send a certain information into the future. For instance, in timed-release encryption, a sender transmits a ciphertext so that a receiver can decrypt it when the time which the sender specified has come, and the receiver cannot decrypt it before the time. The timed-release cryptography was first proposed by May [11] in 1993, and after that, Rivest et al. [13] developed it in a systematic and formal way. Since Rivest et al. gave a formal definition of timed-release encryption in [13] , various researches on timed-release cryptography including timed-release signatures (e.g., [1, 8, 9] ) and timed-release encryption have been done based on computational security. In particular, timed-release public key encryption (TR-PKE for short) has been recently researched intensively. Chan et al. [4] proposed the first TR-PKE scheme, but did not present a formal security definition. Cathalo et al. [2] and Chalkias et al. [3] proposed direct constructions of TR-PKE schemes based on number-theoretic assumptions in the random oracle model. Independently, Cheon et al. [6] proposed a generic construction of TR-PKE and it is efficient and provably secure in the standard model. And also, Fujioka et al. [7] proposed a generic construction of TR-PKE that guarantees strong security in the random oracle model. It also should be noted that Choen et al. [5] recently shows relationships between TR-PKE and key-insulated public-key encryption (KI-PKE for short) with computational security setting.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper which reports on the study of information-theoretic timed-release cryptography. If a sender wants to transmit a message far into the future, informationtheoretic security will be helpful in constructing timed-release mechanism, since its security can provide the long-term security. In this paper, we study timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. As fundamental cryptographic primitives with information-theoretic security, we can consider information-theoretically secure key-agreement, encryption, and authentication codes. Therefore, in this paper, we deal with information-theoretic timed-release security for all those primitives. Specifically, the contribution of this paper is as follows.
• TR-KA. We propose a model and formalization of security for timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA for short) in information-theoretic security setting. We also derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TR-KA. In addition, we propose an optimal direct construction of TR-KA based on multivariate polynomials over finite fields.
• TRE. We propose a model and formalization of security for timed-release encryption (TRE for short) in information-theoretic security setting. In addition, we derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TRE. Furthermore, we present a simple generic construction of TRE: TRE can be constructed from TR-KA and the one-time pad. In particular, the application of our optimal direct construction of TR-KA in the generic construction leads to an optimal direct construction of TRE.
• TRA-code. We propose a model and formalization of security for timed-release authentication codes (TRA-codes for short) in information-theoretic security setting. We also derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TRA-codes. In addition, we present two kinds of constructions, generic and direct ones. Our generic construction of TRA-codes is simple: TRAcodes can be constructed from TR-KA and traditional A-codes. Since the generic construction does not lead to an optimal construction of TRA-codes, we also propose a direct construction which is optimal.
• Relation between TR-KA and KI-KA. We investigate and show relationship between TR-KA and key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA for short) [15] in information-theoretic security setting. It turns out that there exists a simple algorithm which converts TR-KA into KI-KA, and vice versa. Therefore, we can conclude that the mechanisms of TR-KA and KI-KA are essentially close. Note that this relationship in information-theoretic security setting is analogous to that of TR-PKE and KI-PKE in computational security setting shown in [5] .
TR-KA: Timed-Release Key-Agreement with Information-Theoretic Security

Model and Security Definition
In this section we show a model and a security definition of timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA for short) with information-theoretic security. This is done based on those of timed-release schemes with computational security and those of traditional key-agreement with information-theoretic security.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a trusted authority whose role is to generate and to distribute secret-keys of entities. We call this model the trusted initializer model as in [12] . In TR-KA, there are n + 2 entities, n users U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n , a time-server T for broadcasting time-signals and a trusted initializer TI, where n is a positive integer. In this paper, we assume that the identity of each user U i is also denoted by U i . In addition, when any two users communicate each other in a timed-release scheme (i.e., not only TR-KA but also TRE and TRA-codes in the following sections) under consideration in this paper, we call a user who specifies the time a sender and the other a receiver for convenience.
Informally, TR-KA is executed as follows. In the initial phase, TI generates secret-keys on behalf of U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and the time-server T. After distributing these keys via secure channels, TI deletes them in his memory. Any user U i 1 can specify future time when U i 1 wants to share a common-key with a user U i 2 , and he computes a common-key in advance by using U i 1 's secret-key and the identity U i 2 . And U i 1 tells U i 2 the future time which U i 1 specified. The time-server T periodically broadcasts a time-signal at each time which is generated by using T's master-key. When the specified time has come, U i 2 can compute a common-key shared with U i 1 by using U i 2 's secret-key, the identity U i 1 and a time-signal of the specified time. Note that each user has two kinds of secret-keys: one is used for generating a common-key when he is a sender; and the other is used for deriving a common-key when he is a receiver. In TR-KA, we consider a non-interactive model where any two users can share a common-key without interactive communications.
Formally, we give the definition of TR-KA as follows. 1
Definition 1 (TR-KA). A timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA for short) Π involves n + 2 entities, TI, U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n and T, and consists of a four-tuple of algorithms (Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer) with five spaces, T CK, T U K, T MK, T , and T I, where all of the above algorithms except Setup are deterministic and all of the above spaces are finite. In addition, Π is executed with four phases as
follows.
-Notation:
-Entities: TI is a trusted initializer, U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a user and T is a time-server which broadcasts time-signals.
Let U := {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } be the set of all users.
-Spaces: T CK is a set of possible common-keys, and T MK is a set of possible master-keys. T := {1, 2, . . . , τ } is a set of time. T I (t) is a set of time-signals at time t. Let T I := ∪ τ i=1 T I (i) . Also, T U K (S) i is a set of possible U i 's secret-keys for common-key generation. And also, T UK (R) i is a set of possible U i 's secret-keys for common-key derivation. Then, T UK i := T UK (S) i
× T UK (R) i
is the set of possible secret-keys for U i with an associated probability distribution 
MK × T → T I is a timesignal generation algorithm for T , KeyGen: T UK (S) × T × U → T CK is a common-key generation algorithm and KeyDer: T UK (R) × T I × U → T CK is a common-key derivation algorithm.
1. Key Generation and Distribution. In the initial phase, TI generates the following keys by using Setup: a master-key tmk * ∈ T MK for T; and a secret-key tuk i = (tuk In the model of TR-KA, we require the following equation holds: For all possible t ∈ T , i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, tuk
The above requirement implies that any two users can share a commonkey at the specified time without any error if they correctly follow the specification of TR-KA. In addition, tck
means a shared key between U i 1 and U i 2 at time t when U i 1 is the sender and U i 2 is the receiver, and we note that tck
We now define several notation to formalize security of TR-KA as follows. For any finite set Z and any non-negative integer z, let P(Z, z) := {Z ⊂ Z||Z| ≤ z} be the family of all subsets of Z whose cardinality is less than or equal to z. Let ω (< n) be the maximum number of possible colluders. For a set of colluders
denotes the set of possible W 's secret-keys for common-key generation, and T UK
denotes the set of possible W 's secret-keys for common-key derivation. And,
be the set of possible common-keys shared between U i 1 and U i 2 at the time t ∈ T .
Furthermore, let T CK
W , and T I (1) , . . . , T I (τ ) be random variables which take values on T CK
W , and T I (1) , . . . , T I (τ ) , respectively. Next, we formalize a security definition of TR-KA based on the idea of timed-release security and traditional key-agreement with information-theoretic security. In TR-KA, we consider the following security goal and attacking model. First, the security goal which we consider is basically the same as that of the traditional key-agreement: an adversary (or a dishonest entity) cannot obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users. In addition to this, we want to require that even a legitimate receiver cannot obtain any information on a common-key to be shared before the specified time comes (i.e., before a time-signal at the specified time is received), since we consider timed-release security in this paper. Secondly, as an attacking model we consider the following three types of attacks: (1) an attack by a dishonest time-server; (2) an attack by colluders (i.e., dishonest users) not including a receiver; and (3) an attack by colluders including a receiver. By combining the security goal and attacks mentioned above, we formally define security of TR-KA as follows.
Definition 2. Let Π be TR-KA. Π is said to be (n, ω, τ )-secure if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) For any U i 1 , U i 2 ∈ U and t ∈ T , it holds that
∈ W , and for any t ∈ T , it holds that
Intuitively, the meaning of formalizations (1)- (3) in Definition 2 is explained as follows: (1) a dishonest time-server cannot obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users. However, we assume that the time-server correctly broadcasts a time-signal at each time; (2) No information on a common-key shared between two honest users is obtained by any colluding group W not including a legitimate receiver, even if W obtains time-signals at all the time; (3) No information on a common-key between two users at the specified time is obtained by any colluding group W including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver, even if W obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time. 2 
Lower Bounds
In this section, we derive lower bounds of entities' memory-sizes required for secure TR-KA as follows. The proof is given in Appendix A. ) for any i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and t ∈ T . Then, we have
As we will see in the next section, the above lower bounds are tight since our construction will meet all the above inequalities with equalities. Therefore, we define optimality of constructions of TR-KA as follows.
Definition 3.
A construction of (n, ω, τ )-secure TR-KA is said to be optimal if it meets equality in every inequality of (i)-(iv) in Theorem 1.
Construction
We present a construction, which is provably secure TR-KA in our model, by using multivariate polynomials over finite fields. In addition, it is shown that the construction is optimal. The detail of our construction of TR-KA Π=(Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer) is given as follows.
1. Setup. For a security parameter 1 k , Setup outputs matching secret-keys tuk i and tmk * for U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and T, respectively, as follows. Setup picks a k-bit prime power q, where q > max(n, τ ), and constructs the finite field F q with q elements. We assume that the identity of each user U i is encoded as U i ∈ F q \{0}. Also, we assume T = {1, 2, . . . , τ } ⊂ F q \{0} by using appropriate encoding. And, Setup chooses uniformly at random f (x, y) :
b ik x i z k over F q with three variables x, y and z in which each degree of x and y is at most ω, and the degree of z is at most τ − 1. Setup also computes tuk 
, and outputs it.
4.
KeyDer . For a secret-key tuk
, a time-signal tmk (t) at the specified time t and an identity U i 1 ,
KeyDer outputs a common-key shared between U i 1 and U i 2 , tck
The security and optimality of the above construction is stated as follows.
Theorem 2.
The resulting TR-KA Π by the above construction is (n, ω, τ )-secure and optimal.
Proof. In this proof, we can write f (x, y) and tmk * (x, z) in the form of
respectively, where A is an (ω + 1) × (ω + 1) matrix and B is an (ω + 1) × τ matrix, respectively. To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we show the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. The above construction meets H(T CK
Proof. Consider the case that T S will guess tck 
in Proposition 2 in Appendix B, T S cannot guess f (U i 1 , U i 2 ) = xAy with probability larger than 1/q. On the other hand, it is clear that H(T CK 
Lemma 2. The above construction meets H(T CK
Consider the case that a group of colluders W not including a targeted receiver will guess tck (U i 1 , t) . Therefore, the purpose of W is to guess f (
Thus, W can know the following matrix:
. .
In addition, W knows
W . Thus, W can know the following matrix: 
∈ W , and for any t ∈ T ,
Lemma 3. The above construction meets H(T CK
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose that W := {U 1 , . . . , U ω } is a set of colluders such that U i 1 / ∈ W , U i 1 is a targeted sender, U ω is a targeted receiver, and τ is a specified time. In addition, we write
Consider the case that a group of colluders W will guess tck
by using their secret-keys and time-signals at all the time except the specified time. Note that W can get
In addition, W obtains tmk * (x, t) = (1, x, 
∈ W and U i 2 ∈ W , and for any t ∈ T , it holds that
Proof of Theorem 2. It follows that our construction satisfies the conditions (1)- (3) in Definition 2 from the above lemmas. Finally, it is straightforward to see that the construction satisfies all the lower bounds in Theorem 1 with equalities. Therefore, the above construction is optimal.
TRE: Timed-Release Encryption with Information-Theoretic Security
In this section, we show a model and a security formalization of timed-release encryption (TRE for short) with information-theoretic security. We also show that TRE can be constructed from TR-KA and the one-time pad in a generic and simple way. In addition, we derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TRE.
Model and Security Definition
We propose a model and a security definition of TRE, based on that of timed-release encryption with computational security (e.g., [13] ) and that of the traditional encryption with information-theoretic security (e.g., [16] ). Formally, we give a definition of TRE in the TI-model as in the case of TR-KA. 
Definition 4 (TRE
i := EK i × DK i is a set of possible secret-keys for U i . Let EK := ∪ n i=1 EK i , DK := ∪ n i=1 DK i and USK := ∪ n i=1 USK i . -
Encryption. U i 1 specifies time t when U i 2 can decrypt a ciphertext, and then
, an encryption-key ek i 1 ∈ EK, the specified time t and the identity U i 2 . And, U i 1 sends a pair of the ciphertext and the specified time, (c (t) , and the identity U i 1 .
In the model of TRE, we require the following equation holds: For all possible t ∈ T , i 1 
The above requirement means correctness of TRE. Next, we provide a security definition of TRE based on the idea of timed-release security and the traditional encryption with information-theoretic security. The choice of possible colluders W ∈ P(U, ω) is the same as that in TR-KA. For a set of colluders
be a finite set of possible ciphertexts sent from U i 1 to The formalizations of the above security notions for TRE are given as follows.
Definition 5. Let Σ be TRE. Σ is said to be (n, ω, τ )-secure if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) For any U i 1 , U i 2 ∈ U and any t ∈ T , it holds that
and for any t ∈ T , it holds that
H(M | C (t) i 1 ,i 2 , EK W , DK W , ET I (1) , . . . , ET I (τ ) ) = H(M ). (3) For any W ∈ P(U, ω), U i 1 , U i 2 ∈ U such that U i 1 / ∈ W and U i 2 ∈ W , for any t ∈ T , it holds that H(M | C (t) i 1 ,i 2 , EK W , DK W , ET I (1) , . . . , ET I (t−1) , ET I (t+1) , . . . , ET I (τ ) ) = H(M ).
Lower Bounds
We derive lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for secure TRE as follows.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, however, in the proof there are several technical points which are complicated than that of Theorem 1 (See Appendix C for details).
As we will see in the next section, the above lower bounds are tight since an instantiation of our generic construction will meet all the above inequalities with equalities.
Construction of TRE from TR-KA and One-time Pad
We present a generic construction of TRE Σ=(EGen, EExt, Enc, Dec) starting from TR-KA Π=(Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer) and the one-time pad. In our construction, Π and Σ satisfy the following conditions: EMK = T MK; ET I = T I; EK = T UK (S) ; and DK = T UK (R) .
1. EGen. For a security parameter 1 k , EGen outputs matching secret-keys usk i = (ek i , dk i ) and emk * for U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and T, respectively, as follows. EGen calls Setup with input 1 k . Suppose (tuk
i , and emk * := tmk * for U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and T , respectively.
2. EExt. For a master-key emk * = tmk * and time t, EExt calls Ext, and let tmk (t) =Ext(tmk * , t).
Then, EExt outputs a time-signal at the time t, emk (t) := tmk (t) .
Enc. For a plaintext m, an encryption-key
, the specified time t and an identity U i 2 , Enc calls KeyGen, and suppose tck
, a time-signal emk (t) = tmk (t) at the specified time t and an identity U i 1 , Dec calls KeyDer, and suppose tck
The security of the above construction is shown as follows.
Theorem 4. Given (n, ω, τ )-secure TR-KA Π in which common-keys are uniformly distributed over T CK (i.e., H(T CK (t)
i,j ) = log 2 |T CK| for any i, j, and t), then the TRE Σ formed by the above construction based on Π is (n, ω, τ )-secure.
Proof. Let Z be a random variable such that:
Then, for any random variable Z of (1)-(3) mentioned above, we have
where (1) follows from Definition 2 and perfect secrecy of one-time pad c = m ⊕ tck
each pair of M, T CK, Z is independent)
. Therefore, the above construction satisfies the conditions (1)- (3).
Remark 1. Although in this paper we have presented the direct proof of Theorem 1 (i.e., the lower bounds in TR-KA), we can also prove Theorem 1 by using Theorem 3 (i.e., the lower bounds in TRE ) and the above generic construction where uniformly distributed plaintexts are taken.
Remark 2. In the above generic construction, we suppose P M to be uniform (i.e., uniformly distributed plaintexts) and apply the direct (and optimal) construction of TR-KA in Section 2.3. Then, the resulting direct construction of TRE meets equality in every inequality of (i)-(iv) in Theorem 3.
Therefore, the resulting direct construction is optimal and the lower bounds in Theorem 3 are tight.
TRA-codes: Timed-Release Authentication Codes
In this section, we show a model and a security definition of timed-release authentication codes (TRAcodes for short). We also derive tight lower bounds on entities' memory-sizes required for TRA-codes. In addition, we present two kinds of constructions of TRA-codes, generic and direct ones. Our generic construction is simple, while our direct construction is optimal.
Model and Security Definition
We newly propose a model and a security definition of TRA-codes, based on that of timed-release signatures with computational security (e.g., [8] ) and that of the traditional authentication code with information-theoretic security (e.g., [17] ).
Formally, we give a definition of TRA-codes in the TI-model as in the case of TR-KA. 
Definition 6 (TRA-codes
is a set of possible U i 's verification-keys, and
i , and
-Algorithms: TAGen is a key generation algorithm which on input a security parameter 1 k , outputs each user's secret-key and a time-server's master-key, AExt: AMK × T → AT I is a time-signal generation algorithm for T, TAuth: M A × E (S) × T × U → A is an authentication algorithm, and TVer:
M A × A × T × E (R) × AT I × U → {true, f alse} is a verification algorithm.
Key Generation and Distribution. In the initial phase, TI generates the following keys by using TAGen: a master-key amk * ∈ AMK for T; a secret-key e i = (e (S)
i , e , the specified time t and the identity U i 2 . And,
After receiving a time-signal amk (t) at the specified time t, U i 2 checks the validity of α
t) as valid, and rejects it otherwise.
In the model of TRA-codes, we require the following equation holds: for all possible t ∈ T , i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, e
The above requirement means correctness of TRA-codes. Next, we provide a security notion and its formalization for TRA-codes based on the idea of timed-release security and the traditional authentication code with information-theoretic security.
The choice of possible colluders W ∈ P(U, ω) is the same as that in TR-KA. For a set of colluders
is a set of W 's verification-keys. In TRA-codes, we consider impersonation attacks and substitution attacks as follows. (a) Impersonation attacks: an adversary (or a dishonest entity) tries to generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time t, (m, α
, that has not been legally generated by a sender U i 1 but will be accepted by a receiver U i 2 . (b) Substitution attacks: an adversary (or a dishonest entity) tries to generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time t 2 , (m ′ , α
, that has not been legally generated by a sender U i 1 but will be accepted by a receiver U i 2 , after observing a valid authenticated message at time t 1 , (m, α
, t 2 ). Similarly as in Definition 2 we consider the following three types of security notions for TRA-codes: (1) A dishonest time-server cannot succeed in each of the impersonation attack and substitution attack ; (2) Any colluding group W not including a legitimate receiver cannot succeed in each of the impersonation attack and substitution attack, even if W obtains time-signals at all the time; (3) Any colluding group W including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver cannot check the validity of a target authenticated message without a time-signal at the specified time, even if W obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time. To formalize this security notion, we consider it to be a kind of security against impersonation attacks at the future specified time: Any colluding group W including a receiver cannot succeed in impersonation attacks at the future specified time, even if W obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time.
The formalizations of the above three types of security notions for TRA-codes are given as follows.
where P Server , P 1 and P 2 are defined as follows.
(1) Attacks by a dishonest time-server. Let P Server := max(P I S , P S S ), where P I S and P S S are given as follows.
1-1) Impersonation attacks. The success probability of this attack denoted by P I S is defined as follows: For any
The probability P I S is defined as P I S := max
1-2) Substitution attacks. The success probability of this attack denoted by P S S is defined as follows: For any
The probability P S S is defined as P S S := max
(2) Attacks by colluders not including a legitimate receiver. Let P 1 := max(P I 1 , P S 1 ), where P I 1 and P S 1 are given as follows.
2-1) Impersonation attacks. The success probability of this attack denoted by P I 1 is defined as follows: For any set of colluders
W , e
W , amk (1) , . . . , amk (τ ) ).
The probability P I 1 is defined as P I 1 := max
2-2) Substitution attacks. The success probability of this attack denoted by P S 1 is defined as follows: For any set of colluders
And, P S 1 is defined as P S 1 := max 
The probability P 2 is defined as P 2 := max
Lower Bounds
We derive lower bounds on success probabilities of attacks and memory-sizes required for (n, ω, τ ; ϵ)-secure TRA-codes. Let MA
for some e
} be a set of possible pairs of messages and authenticators such that each element of the set can be generated by the sender U i 1 to send it to U i 2 at specified future time t.
W , AT I (1) , . . . , AT I (τ ) be random variables which take values in MA
(1) , . . . , AT I (τ ) , respectively. We assume that there exist the following mappings in the model of TRA-codes: for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and every t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ },
i is given, TRA-codes look like MRA-codes [14] . From this, it would be natural to assume a mapping E
i is given, in TRA-codes as in the model of MRA-codes (see Definition 3.1 in [14] ). In addition, from the footnote of this page, we have assumed the above mapping ρ i,j : E
From the explanation, we consider that the assumption of existence of the above mappings is not so strange, rather natural, and we will show that these mappings actually exist in our simple direct construction in Section 4.4.
Then, we can derive lower bounds on success probabilities of attacks as follows. 
The proof can be shown in a way similar to that of [14, Theorem 3.2] . We next show lower bounds on memory-sizes of entities in TRA-codes. The proof is given in Appendix D. 
As we will see in Section 4.4, the above lower bounds are all tight since our direct construction will meet all the above inequalities with equalities. Therefore, we define optimality of constructions of TRA-codes as follows.
Definition 8.
A construction of (n, ω, τ ; ϵ)-secure TRA-codes is said to be optimal if it meets equality in every inequality of (i)-(v) in Theorem 6.
Generic Construction of TRA-codes from TR-KA and A-codes
We propose a generic construction of (n, ω, τ ; ϵ)-secure TRA-codes from TR-KA and the traditional A-codes (e.g., [17] ). First, we briefly explain the traditional A-codes as follows.
A-codes.
We consider a scenario where there are three entities, a sender S, a receiver R, and an adversary A. The A-code Θ consists of a three-tuple of algorithms (AGen, Auth, Ver ) with three spaces,M,Ã andẼ, where they are finite sets of possible messages, possible authenticators (or tags) and possible secret-keys, respectively. AGen is a key generation algorithm, which takes a security parameter on input and outputs a secret-key e. Auth is an algorithm for generating an authenticator. Auth takes a message m ∈M and a secret-key e ∈Ẽ on input and outputs an authenticator α ∈Ã, and we write α =Auth(m, e) for it. On receiving (m, α), a receiver R can check the validity of it by using Ver. Ver takes a message m, an authenticator α and a secret-key e on input, and outputs true or false, and we write true=Ver (m, α, e) or false=Ver (m, α, e) for it. In A-codes, there are two kinds of attacks: impersonation attacks and substitution attacks. Here, Θ is said to be ϵ-secure if each of success probabilities of these attacks is at most ϵ (e.g., see [17] for details).
The detail of our generic construction of TRA-codes Λ=(TAGen, AExt, TAuth, TVer) by using TR-KA Π=(Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer) and A-codes Θ=(AGen, Auth, Ver) is given as follows. 
4.
TVer . For a message m, the specified time t, an authenticator α
, a time-signal amk (t) = tmk (t) at the specified time t and an identity U i 1 , TVer calls KeyDer with inputting them, and suppose tck
) =true, and outputs false otherwise.
The security of the above construction is shown as follows. Proof. First, we show the proof of P S S ≤ ϵ to prove P Server ≤ ϵ (i.e., condition (1)). Assume that T S tries to generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time t 2 , (m ′ , α ′ , t 2 ), that will be accepted by a receiver U i 2 , after observing a valid authenticated message at time t 1 , (m, α, t 1 ). Then, we have
= max
where (2) follows from the correctness of TR-KA, (3) follows from Definition 2 (i.e., tmk * is unhelpful to guess tck
, and P S is the success probability of substitution attacks in ϵ-secure A-codes. Thus, we have P S S ≤ ϵ. In a manner similar to this, we can prove P I S ≤ ϵ. Therefore, we have P Server = max(P I S , P S S ) ≤ ϵ.
Next, we show the proof of P S 1 ≤ ϵ to prove P 1 ≤ ϵ (i.e., condition (2)). Assume that any colluding group W not including a targeted receiver tries to generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time t 2 , (m ′ , α ′ , t 2 ), that will be accepted by a receiver U i 2 , after observing a valid authenticated message at time t 1 
, (m, α, t 1 ). Let Info(W ) := (e (S)
where (4) follows from the correctness of TR-KA, (5) follows from Definition 2 (i.e., Info(W ) is unhelpful to guess tck
, and P S is the success probability of substitution attacks in ϵ-secure Acodes. Thus, we have P S 1 ≤ ϵ. In a manner similar to this, we can prove P I 1 ≤ ϵ. Therefore, we have
Finally, we show the proof of P 2 ≤ ϵ (i.e., condition (3)). Assume that any colluding group W including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver tries to check the validity of a target authenticated message without a time-signal at the specified time, even if W obtains time-signals at all the time except the specified time. Let
Info(W ) := (e (S)
W , e Pr(TVer(m, α
Pr(KeyDer(tuk
Pr (V er((m, t) , α, tck
where (6) follows from Definition 2 (i.e., Info(W ) is unhelpful to guess tck
) and P I is the success probability of impersonation attacks in ϵ-secure A-codes. Thus, we have P 2 ≤ ϵ.
Remark 3. Even if we apply optimal constructions of TR-KA and A-codes in the above generic construction, we cannot obtain an optimal construction of TRA-codes. For example, consider the optimal construction of TR-KA in Section 2.3 and the well-known optimal construction of A-codes given by Auth(m, e) = am + b, where m is an element of a finite field F q and e = (a, b) ∈ F 2
q . We can quite smoothly apply these constructions in our generic construction since both ones are given based on polynomials over F q . However, the resulting construction of TRA-codes is not optimal. Therefore, in the next section we will show that there exists a direct construction (i.e., a construction from scratch) which satisfies Definition 8.
Direct Construction of TRA-codes by Polynomials over Finite Fields
We propose a direct construction of (n, ω, τ ; ϵ)-secure TRA-codes. In addition, it is shown that the construction is optimal. The detail of our construction of TRA-codes Λ=(AGen, AExt, TAuth, TVer) is given as follows.
1. AGen. For a security parameter 1 k , AGen outputs matching secret-keys e i and amk * for U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and T, respectively, as follows. AGen picks a k-bit prime power q, where q > max(n, τ ), and constructs the finite field F q with q elements. We assume that the identity of each user U i is encoded as U i ∈ F q \{0}. Also, we assume T = {1, 2, . . . , τ } ⊂ F q \{0} by using appropriate encoding. And, AGen chooses uniformly at random f (x, y) :
c ik x i z k over F q with three variables x, y and z in which each degree of x and y is at most ω, and the degree of z is at most τ − 1. AGen also computes e (S)
2. AExt. For amk * = amk * (x, z) and time t ∈ T , Ext outputs a time-signal at time t, amk (t) (x) := amk * (x, t).
TAuth. For a message m, a secret-key e
(S) i 1 , the specified time t and an identity U i 2 , TAuth generates an authenticator, α 
t) holds, and otherwise outputs false.
Theorem 8.
The resulting TRA-code Λ by the above construction is (n, ω, τ ; 1/q)-secure and optimal.
Proof. In this proof, we can write f (x, y), g(x, y) and tmk * (x, z) in the form of
respectively, where A and B are (ω + 1) × (ω + 1) matrices and C is an (ω + 1) × τ matrix, respectively. To complete the proof of Theorem 8, we show the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. The above construction satisfies
Proof. First, we show the proof of P S S ≤ 1/q. Assume that T S will generate a fraudulent authenticated message at time t 2 (m ′ , α
, t 2 ), under the following conditions: T S can obtain a valid authenticated message (m, α
, t 1 ) where m ̸ = m ′ and knows his master-key amk * . To begin with, since T S knows amk * , he can compute amk * (U i 1 , t 2 ). Therefore, he tries to generate g( 
in Proposition 2 in Appendix B, T S cannot guess f (U i 1 , U i 2 ) = xAy with probability larger than 1/q. In a similar way, we can prove that T S cannot guess g(U i 1 , U i 2 ) with probability larger than 1/q. Hence, P S S ≤ 1/q. We can also prove P S I ≤ 1/q. Thus, we have P Server = max(P S I , P S S ) ≤ 1/q.
Lemma 5. The above construction satisfies
Proof. First, we show the proof of P 1 S ≤ 1/q. Without loss of generality, we consider that W := {U 1 , . . . , U ω } is a set of colluders such that U i 1 , U i 2 / ∈ W , and we write 
By applying X := X U , A := B and Y := t X U in Proposition 1 in Appendix B, there are at least q candidates of B. In addition,
2 with probability larger than 1/q by Proposition 2 in Appendix B. Hence, P 1 S ≤ 1/q. We can also prove P 1 I ≤ 1/q. Thus, we have P 1 = max(P 1 I , P 1 S ) ≤ 1/q.
Lemma 6. The above construction satisfies
To succeed in the substitution attack by a group of colluders W , W will try to check the validity of a target authenticated message without a time-signal at the specified time under the following conditions: W can obtain ω user's secret-keys, time-signals at all the time except the specified time τ , and a valid authenticated message (m, α
In addition, W obtains amk * (x, t) = (1, x, . . . , x ω )Cy t for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ − 1 by time-signals at all except the time τ . Thus, W can know the following matrix: Proof of Theorem 8. It follows that max(P Server , P 1 , P 2 ) ≤ 1/q from the above lemmas. Finally, it is straightforward to see that the construction satisfies all the lower bounds in Theorem 6 with equalities. Therefore, the above construction is optimal.
Relation to Information-Theoretic Key-Insulated Security
In this section, we show relationship between TR-KA and key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA for short) in information-theoretic security setting.
Key-Insulated Key Agreement (KI-KA)
Recently, information-theoretically secure KI-KA is proposed by Seito and Shikata [15] . In KI-KA, there areñ users U 1 , U 2 , . . . , Uñ whereñ is a positive integer. And each user has two kinds of devices: a trusted device (e.g., a smart card, USB flash memory) which stores a master-key; and an insecure device in which a user's secret-key is stored. Here, the notion of a secure device implies that it is usually isolated from a network (e.g. the Internet or LAN) and that the attacker can neither wiretap nor substitute information stored in the device via the network. Here, we assume that the user U i 's secure device is expressed as H i (1 ≤ i ≤ñ) . We also assume that the lifetime of systems is divided into discrete periods. And, at the beginning of each period j, U i receives key-updating information from H i by connecting with H i , then U i computes a secret-key at the period j by using the secret-key of the previous period and key-updating information. And then, any user U i 1 can share a common-key with any user U i 2 at a period j.
Formally, we describe the definition of the model of KI-KA shown in [15] . (1 ≤ i ≤ñ) , and we describe uk
is a U i 's secret-key at a period j. KDer: UK ×Ũ → CK is a key derivation algorithm, and we write ck
where ck
∈ CK is a common-key shared between U i 1 and U i 2 at a period j.
In KI-KA, it is required that the following equation holds: for all possible j ∈T , i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,ñ}, uk
And, in KI-KA, the following security goal is considered.
-The adversary does not obtain any information on a common-key shared between two honest users at a target period.
And, as an adversarial model, it is assume that an adversary can obtain the following information on user's keys exposed in KI-KA.
-A user's secret-key from the insecure device.
-A user's master-key exposed (or robbed) from the secure device.
Especially, in KI-KA, it is considered that the following two types of exposure from targeted users.
-Type A: Targeted users' secret-keys exposure, which models compromise of targeted users' secretkeys from their insecure devices (i.e., the attack to steal a secret-key stored in an insecure device via a network). -Type B: Targeted users' master-keys exposure, which models compromise of their secure devices by physical means (i.e., the attack to steal a master-key stored in a secure device directly).
To show the formal definition of the above security notions, we describe the several notations. Let ψ be the number of possible users whose master-keys are exposed, let λ be the number of possible users whose secret-keys are exposed per period, and letω be a nonnegative integer withω ≥ ψ + λ. And, let γ be the number of possible periods at which secret-keys are exposed per user. And also, let Ψ := {U i 1 , U i 2 , . . . , U i ψ } ∈ P(Ũ , ψ) be a set of users whose master-keys are exposed, and
be a set of users whose secret-keys at the period j are exposed. Here, we note that Λ (j) satisfies the following condition: for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,ñ}, |{j|U i ∈ Λ (j) for some j ∈T }| ≤ γ. The above condition implies that for every U i , the number of periods at which U i 's secret-keys may be exposed is at most γ. Also, let UK
be a set of users' secret-keys exposed at the period j.
And, let CK
be a finite set of possible common-keys shared between U i 1 and U i 2 at a period
⊂ I i be a finite set of possible U i 's key-updating information which is used for key-updating process from a period h to a period j. And, let CK
be random variables which take values on CK
Λ , respectively. With these notation, we formally define security notions of KI-KA as follows.
Definition 10 ([15]
). LetΠ be a KI-KA andω ≥ ψ + λ.Π is said to be (ñ,ω; N, γ)-secure, if the following conditions are satisfied:
For any set of users Ψ ∈ P(Ũ, ψ) whose master-keys are exposed, any set of users Λ (j) ∈ P(Ũ, λ)
whose secret-keys at the period j are exposed, and any target period t ∈T , it holds that
under each of the following conditions: (a) any
In this paper, we introduce a slightly weaker security: There is no exposure of users' secret-keys at the target period; and either Type A (users' secret-key exposure) or Type B (users' master-key exposure) occurs. Formally, it is stated as follows. (ñ,ω; N, γ) -weakly-secure, if the following conditions are satisfied.
Definition 11. LetΠ be a KI-KA.Π is said to be
For any
U i 1 , U i 2 ∈Ũ and any j ∈T , it holds that H(CK (j) i 1 ,i 2 |U K (j) i 1 , U i 2 ) = 0.
For any U i 1 , U i 2 ∈Ũ and any target period t ∈T , the following security conditions are sarisfied:
(a) For any set of users Λ (j) ∈ P(Ũ,ω) whose secret-keys at the period j (1 ≤ j ≤ N, j ̸ = t) are exposed, it holds that
).
(b) For any set of users Ψ ∈ P(Ũ,ω) whose master-keys are exposed such that
U i 1 , U i 2 ̸ ∈ Ψ, it holds that H(CK (t) i 1 ,i 2 |M K Ψ ) = H(CK (t) i 1 ,i 2 ).
Relationship between TR-KA and KI-KA
In KI-KA, any user cannot update a secret-key without using key-updating information which is generated by the master-key. That is to say, the user's key-updating process is controlled by the device's master-key and key-updating information. On the other hand, in TR-KA, no receiver can derive a common-key without using a time-signal corresponding to a designated period (time). Namely, the receiver's common-key derivation process is controlled by the time-server's master-key and the time-signal. From the above observation, the mechanisms of KI-KA and TR-KA are similar in the point that a common-key (or a secret-key required for deriving a common-key) derivation process is controlled by a master-key. The above statement is explicitly shown by proposing two generic constructions (or converters) in a simple way: one is a construction of KI-KA from TR-KA; and the other is a construction of TR-KA from KI-KA. In the following sections, we will see that the mechanisms of TR-KA and KI-KA are essentially close by showing the generic constructions.
KI-KA from TR-KA
We first propose a simple algorithm which converts a secure TR-KA Π=(Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer) into a secure KI-KAΠ=(KGen, KUpd * , KUpd, KDer). More precisely, we propose a generic construction method of KI-KA by using TR-KA, and it meets the security requirements of KI-KA. The detail of the construction is as follows. 
n , tmk * ) be the output from Setup. Then, KGen outputs secret-keys uk i , j, tmk (j) ), and outputs it. 3. KDer . For uk
, j, tmk (j) ) and an identity U i 2 , KDer calls KeyGen and KeyDer and generates the following two values:
Then, KDer outputs a common-key at a period j, ck
The security of the above construction is shown as follows. 
Proof. From the requirement of TR-KA shown in Section 2, it is obvious that the proposed construction satisfies the first condition in Definition 11. And, we show the proposed construction fulfills the second conditions (a) and (b) in Definition 11. In the following, suppose that U i 1 and U i 2 are target users and t ∈T is a target period, and that the adversary tries to obtain any information about a common-key ck
shared between U i 1 and U i 2 at the period t.
Condition (a). We consider the following case for (a) in Definition 11:
1. No devices' master-key is compromised, and no sender's secret-keys is compromised, i.e., Ψ = ∅ and
be a set of users whose secret-keys at the period j is compromised (1 ≤ j ≤ N , j ̸ = t); and 2. No user's secret-key at the targeted period t is compromised, i.e., Λ (t) := ∅.
Then, we have
= H(T CK
= H(CK
4 The case of Ui 2 / ∈ Λ (j) can be similarly discussed, and we omit it here.
where (7) and (9) follow from the construction, and (8) follows from Definition 2.
Condition (b). We consider the following case for (b) in Definition 11:
-No user's secret-key is compromised through a whole period, i.e. Λ (j) = ∅ for 1 ≤ j ≤ N . Let Ψ(̸ = ∅) be an arbitrary set of users whose master-keys are exposed (Note that M K Ψ = {tmk * } for any Ψ ̸ = ∅ from the construction).
Then, we have
where (10) and (12) follow from the construction, and (11) follows from Definition 2.
TR-KA from KI-KA
Next, we show a simple algorithm which converts a secure KI-KAΠ=(KGen, KUpd * , KUpd, KDer) into a secure TR-KA Π=(Setup, Ext, KeyGen, KeyDer). We now describe a construction method of Π fromΠ.
1. Setup. For a security parameter 1 k , Setup outputs each entity's secret-key as follows. Setup calls KGen with inputs 1 k to generate secret-keys for two setsŨ :
2.S , uk
2.R , . . . , uk 
and outputs a common-key at a period j, tck
n.R ) and an identity U i 1 , KeyDer calls KUpd and generates uk
, and outputs a common-key at a period j, tck
We give a proof that the above construction is secure TR-KA as follows. 5 In this construction, each identity Ui ∈ U consists of two identities Ui.S, Ui.R ∈Ũ . 
Proof. We show that the proposed construction satisfies the conditions (1)- (3) in Definition 2. In the following, suppose that U i 1 and U i 2 are target users, and that t ∈ T is the specified time.
Condition (1). Suppose n ≤ω. Then, we have
where Ψ = {U 1.R , U 2.R , . . . , U n.R }, (13) follows from Definition 10, and (14) follows by the construction.
Condition (2) . Suppose n + ω ≤ω. Without loss of generality, we consider the following case.
•
• W tries to obtain any information on tck
where (15) follows from Definition 10, and (16) follows by the construction. Obviously, we have
Therefore, we obtain H(T CK
Condition (3). Suppose n + ω ≤ω. Without loss of generality, we consider the following case.
• W := {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U ω−1 , U i 2 } is a set of colluders including a legitimate (but dishonest) receiver U i 2 .
• W tries to obtain any information about tck
by using information on time-signals at all the time except the specified time t.
Then, we obtain
where (17) follows from Definition 10, and (18) follows by the construction. Therefore, we have
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied timed-release cryptography with information-theoretic security. Specifically, we first proposed a model and formalization of security for timed-release key-agreement (TR-KA) in information-theoretic security setting. In addition, we derived tight lower bounds on memory-sizes required for TR-KA, and we proposed the optimal direct construction. Also, we proposed models and formalizations of security for timed-release encryption (TRE) and authentication-codes (TRA-codes) in information-theoretic security setting. We also presented simple generic constructions of TRE and TRA-codes, respectively. Furthermore, we derived tight lower bounds on memory-sizes required for TRE and TRA-codes, respectively, and we also proposed optimal direct constructions of TRE and TRA-codes, respectively.
Moreover, we showed the relationship between TR-KA and key-insulated key-agreement (KI-KA) in information-theoretic security setting. We have shown that there exists a simple algorithm which converts TR-KA into KI-KA, and vice versa. Therefore, we conclude that the mechanisms of TR-KA and KI-KA are essentially close. 
Proof
where (19) follows from the condition (2) in Definition 2.
Lemma 8. H(T U K
(S) i ) ≥ (τ + ω)H(T CK) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Proof. For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we take a subset B := {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l ω+1 } ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} of indices of users such that i / ∈ B. Let D k := (i, l k ) and W k := {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l k } for each k with 1 ≤ k ≤ ω + 1. Also, let F (t) k := (T CK (1) D k , T CK (2) D k , . . . , T CK (t) D k ) and G (t) k := (T CK (t) D 1 , T CK (t) D 2 , . . . , T CK (t) D k ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ ω + 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ τ . Then, we have H(T U K (S) i ) ≥ H(F (τ ) 1 , G (t) ω+1 ) = H(F (τ ) 1 ) + H(G (t) ω+1 | F (τ ) 1 ) = τ ∑ t=1 H(T CK (t) D 1 | F (t−1) 1 ) + ω+1 ∑ k=2 H(T CK (t) D k | F (τ ) 1 , T CK (t) D 2 , . . . , T CK (t) D k−1 ) ≥ τ ∑ t=1 H(T CK (t) D 1 | T U K (R) D 1 , T I (1) , . . . , T I (t−1) ) + ω+1 ∑ k=2 H(T CK (t) D k | T U K (R) W k−1 , T I (1) , . . . , T I (τ ) ) = τ ∑ t=1 H(T CK (t) D 1 ) + ω+1 ∑ k=2 H(T CK (t) D k )(20)
= (τ + ω)H(T CK),
where (20) follows from the conditions (2) and (3) in Definition 2.
Proof. First, let X, A, and Y be
respectively. Then, we can write
Since we have the equation W Y = XZ, it holds that, for any α, β with 1 ≤ α ≤ h and 1 ≤ β ≤ k,
Thus, with respect to unknowns a s,
, we have at most hj + ik − hk linearly independent equations. Therefore, the number of unknowns not uniquely determined is at least
and it is positive if i > h and j > k. From this, it follows that A has at least q solutions. Proof. First, we assume that X and Y are (i − 1) × i matrix and j × (j − 1) matrix, respectively, such that rank X = i−1 and rank Y = j −1. It is obvious that the mapping f is F q -linear. In addition, since f is F q -linear, Imf is a linear subspace of F q . Therefore, by Lemma 11, dim(Im f ) is 0 or 1. We will show that dim(Im f ) = 1 (i.e., Im f = F q ). To prove this, it is sufficient to show that, for A, A ′ ∈ χ 0 with A ̸ = A ′ , we have xAy ̸ = xA ′ y. Suppose on the contrary that xAy = xA ′ y. LetX := Next, we consider a general case that X and Y are h × i matrix and j × k matrix, respectively, with i > h and j > k. LetX be an (i − 1) × i matrix such that: rankX = i − 1; x is not contained in the F q -vector space generated by row vectors ofX; and the F q -vector space generated by row vectors ofX contains the vector space generated by row vectors of X. Similarly, letỸ be an j × (j − 1) matrix such that: rankỸ = j − 1; y is not contained in the F q -vector space generated by column vectors of Y ; and the F q -vector space generated by column vectors ofỸ contains the vector space generated by column vectors of Y . Lettingχ 0 := {A |XA = O, AỸ = O}, and we haveχ 0 ⊂ χ 0 . Therefore, it holds that f : χ 0 → F q defined by f (A) := xAy is surjective, since f |χ 0 is surjective as shown by the above paragraph.
Proposition 2. Let i > h and
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that, if A is chosen from χ uniformly at random, a value of xAy cannot be guessed with probability larger than 1/q. For proving it, it is sufficient to show that, for every t ∈ F q , Pr[t = xAy] = 1/q if A is chosen from χ uniformly at random. Definef : χ → F q bŷ f (A) := xAy, and fix some A 1 ∈ χ. Then, arbitrary A ∈ χ is expressed by A = A 0 + A 1 (A 0 ∈ χ 0 ) by Lemma 11, and then,f (A) = xA 0 y + xA 1 y = f (A 0 ) + xA 1 y. Note that A being chosen from χ uniformly at random is equivalent to that A 0 being chosen from χ 0 uniformly at random. If A 0 is chosen from χ 0 uniformly at random, we have Pr[t = f (A 0 )] = 1/q for every t ∈ F q since f is F q -linear and surjective by Lemma 12. Therefore, since f (A 0 ) takes every value of F q with equal probability and xA 1 y is fixed,f (A) = f (A 0 ) + xA 1 y takes every value of F q with equal probability.
C Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from the lemmas in this appendix. In this appendix, for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ }, M (t) i,j denotes the random variable which takes plaintexts to be sent from U i to U j at time t, and M 
where (23) ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ − 1.
Proof. LetF ),
where (32) follows from Enc algorithm in Definition 4 (i.e., H(C
, EK i ) = 0). On the other hand, we have
, . . . , F
where ( ). Hence, we have
Finally, from (31) and (36), we have H(C
Proof of Lemma 14 : Now, the proof of Lemma 14 is completed. 
Lemma 15. H(ET I
(
